

A coherent European Union policy on mixed migration in the Horn of Africa: Participatory, contextual and rights-based

NOVEMBER 2017

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Introduction

Major political, social and economic problems in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region have triggered large-scale mixed migration within the region and created an environment and market for exploitation and abuse. They have also resulted in large numbers of people leaving the region, with some making their way north through Libya or Egypt, across the Mediterranean, and into Europe.

The visibility and scale of people arriving in Europe in recent years – both from Africa and the Middle East – have led to a series of responses by European states: a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been established with the ultimate intention of reducing the numbers of those reaching Europe's borders.

In the African context, the 2015 Valletta Summit on migration Action Plan translated European Union (EU) policy objectives on migration and mobility into action points, “designed to (1) address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; (2) enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility; (3) reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; (4) prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and (5) work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.”¹

1 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration 11-12 November 2015.

Available at

www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12 (Accessed 5 October 2017).

The Valletta Action Plan is being implemented through specific initiatives, including the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Initiative, known as the Khartoum Process.² In its current phase, this initiative focuses on tackling smuggling and trafficking, particularly in the form of a project known as Better Migration Management led by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).³ It uses a partnership model in which European states, the EU and international organisations, particularly the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), provide funding and help to build the capacity of states in the region in order to achieve the policy objectives. The EU has promoted the partnership model pursued in the Khartoum Process as a solution to the regional migration challenge. However, the underlying assumptions, modes of intervention, and partnerships with regimes in the region have generated considerable concern, unease and opposition.⁴

This policy paper argues that current policy initiatives on migration, particularly the Khartoum Process, do not provide a framework or approach that is effective and sustainable to address causes, dynamics and consequences of mixed migration flows from the HoA. This argument is based on extensive empirical research with Eritreans on the move, in which 67 qualitative interviews were conducted in Ethiopia, Sudan and Europe (See IRRI, SIHA and SOAS, “Tackling the root causes of human trafficking and smuggling from Eritrea: The need for an empirically grounded EU policy on mixed migration in the Horn of Africa.” October 2017). The intention of the report was not to examine the various projects and initiatives being carried out under the framework as these are mostly at the early stages of implementation, but to focus on the overall approach, and suggest why several of its underlying assumptions

and key aspects might be problematic. Furthermore, because a large percentage of Eritreans appear to be refugees, it focuses in particular on refugee policy.

The paper starts by outlining key findings from the research. It then presents the model of partnership underlying the Khartoum Process and a number of problematic assumptions on which it is based, before drawing on the findings to propose an alternative approach to international cooperation on migration in the HoA. The paper ends with specific policy recommendations.

Summary of the findings

Eritreans leave their country to flee forced conscription, political repression and lack of economic prospects; and they mostly rely on smugglers to ensure that they successfully evade border controls in their efforts to reach safety, as the majority of Eritreans are unable to leave their country legally. Their irregular entry into neighbouring countries, and their often-precarious status, has made individual migrants and refugees vulnerable to trafficking, particularly in refugee camps. Smuggling and trafficking in human beings has developed into a transnational business operated by criminal networks, whose members often come from disadvantaged backgrounds.

While states and their capacity to operate are undeniably part of the solution to the situation of refugees and migrants in the HoA, the findings also make it clear that they are often also the cause. The responses of state institutions and local level bureaucrats in the region to refugees and migrants vary significantly, not only between countries but also within each of the states. While some institutions and officials offer

2 Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative), Rome, 28 November 2014. See further www.khartoumprocess.net.

3 EUTF, Action Fiche for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window, T05-EUTF-HoA-REG-09: Better Migration Management (Khartoum Process) (undated); GIZ, Description of the Action: Better Migration Management, Annex I to the Delegation Agreement CRIS No. [EUTF05-HoA-REG-20], 2016.

4 Civil Society Statement on Push Factors in Sudan and the Khartoum Process, 2016. Available at [http://sudanconsortium.org/darfur_consortium_actions/pressreleases/2016/Civil%20Society%20Statement%20on%20Push%20Factors%20in%20Sudan%20and%20the%20Khartoum%20Process%20final%20\(1\).pdf](http://sudanconsortium.org/darfur_consortium_actions/pressreleases/2016/Civil%20Society%20Statement%20on%20Push%20Factors%20in%20Sudan%20and%20the%20Khartoum%20Process%20final%20(1).pdf) (Accessed 5 October 2017); R. Marsden, “The migration crisis and the Horn of Africa: the Khartoum Process”, *Confrontations Europe*, 11 October 2015; Human Rights Watch, “EU/AU: Put Rights at Heart of Migration Efforts”, New York, 9 November 2015; European Parliament, “Khartoum Process and the forthcoming ‘EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative’ (debate)”, 17 December 2014; European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2016 on Sudan (2016/2911 (RSP)); All Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan, *Engagement beyond the Centre: An Inquiry Report on the Future of UK-Sudan Relations*, February 2017, 30-33.

protection and assistance to people on the move and respect human rights, other state institutions are predatory and carry different degrees of responsibility for the abuses that refugees and migrants suffer from.

Most Eritreans who decide to migrate have a clear knowledge of the fact that they are taking a huge risk to their own safety, but are usually only vaguely aware of the specifics of that risk, and how to avoid it. Family links play an important role in the context of decision-making: most people get their information from family and friends, rather than from state institutions, NGOs or the media. Whether inside Eritrea or outside it, ultimately people look to those who they most trust for information.

Thus, decisions to cross borders irregularly and take extreme risks are often taken when alternative options are perceived to be equally bad, or potentially worse. What policy makers view as an ill-informed decision is often calculated risk-taking. Many of those who migrate irregularly do so not because they are unaware of legal migration procedures or because these are “non-transparent and over-bureaucratic,”⁵ but because it is clear to them that the legal routes are so limited for people in their situation that they cannot rely on them as viable solutions.

Those interviewed made a distinction between smugglers as service providers who are helping people to flee a repressive state, and traffickers who are a source of exploitation and abuse. However, the line between smugglers as “humanitarians” and the abuses associated with trafficking is painfully thin. People are acutely aware of this and attempt to mitigate the risk by using smugglers or routes that are perceived to be more reliable and safe. As a result, people’s descriptions of their journeys pointed to a pattern in which their journeys become increasingly dangerous, often as the original linkage between the migrants and the original smuggler gets weaker. As their journeys progress and people are passed from one smuggler to the next, their vulnerability increases.

Many of those who move from the region to Europe do so as a result of failures in refugee policies in first

countries of asylum, policies that have left millions of people living for years and sometimes decades in a protracted situation of exile. These failures hinge primarily around the emphasis on encampment for those in exile and failures around access to work and durable solutions. Combined, these policy failures have created a semi-permanent state of emergency, jeopardising quality of life and bringing the humanitarian system to breaking point.⁶

The partnership model driving the Khartoum Process

The Khartoum Process operates within this context. The findings point to a number of concerns that revolve around the fact that it relies primarily on a top-down, instrumentalist response to migration. Its priorities, underlying assumptions, division of roles and the use of diplomatic and economic incentives insufficiently speak to the experiences of migrants and refugees in the region and, therefore, are ill-suited to address the problems identified. It is:

- **State centric in its policy conception and implementation:** it has been pursued at ministerial level with some participation of international organisations, but not from civil society in the region, and focuses on building the capacity of policy makers and state institutions;
- **Instrumentalist:** takes a managerial approach in which problems identified are addressed by means of projects that follow a project logic, with specific interventions designed to produce specific results for designated target groups within a specific time frame, using project monitoring tools;
- **Based on a problematic political economy:** partnering in migration management provides political and economic incentives for partner states that are implicated in human rights violations, and changes the nature of their relationships with donor governments;

5 The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) COM (2011) 743, 18 Nov. 2011.

6 For an extensive critique of the impact of these policy failures, see Lucy Hovil, *Refugees, Conflict and the Search for Belonging*. Palgrave 2016, 155 – 191.

- **Regionally contained:** problems are portrayed as regional and in need of regional solutions. International actors, such as the EU, are perceived as helping partners in Africa finding solutions to their local problems, rather than sharing joint responsibility.

The Khartoum Process treats cross-border movement, in the form of smuggling and trafficking, as an issue of law enforcement rather than as a symptom of deep-seated governance problems. It does not acknowledge, or address, how partner states in the region are responsible for forced migration and the violation of human rights and refugee rights. Instead, the challenges faced by states are identified as a lack of capacity in respect to policies, laws and institutions in the relevant field.

A sole focus on targeted, narrow capacity building, however, reduces the combating of trafficking and smuggling to a technocratic, law enforcement exercise. This overlooks the role of state authorities in armed conflicts, discrimination and human rights violations, including restrictions, such as freedom to leave one's country, which are key factors in sustaining demand for smuggling, and the reported complicity in practices such as trafficking in human beings. It also ignores the fact that capacity building in a specific area of law enforcement and criminal justice is insufficient in institutional settings characterised by systemic shortcomings.

Concerns over a de-contextual approach are not confined to states in the region. The role of policies (migration, economic, development) and political interventions (diplomatic and economic support for states, supply of arms) by EU states/the EU are also not recognised as relevant factors that contribute to, or help to sustain, situations that prompt migration, or certain practices, such as smuggling and trafficking in human beings.

Furthermore, the policy of the EU and European states on migration in the HoA has overshadowed earlier

African-led initiatives,⁷ and the resulting partnership model is largely driven by European interests and demands. As a result, it is asymmetrical, with EU and European states providing funding, services and other benefits in return for implementation of migration management. This equation incentivises states in the HoA to prioritise economic and political interests over attempts to undertake the fundamental reforms needed to tackle the root causes of mixed migration.

The risk that this partnership will prioritise the interests of states rather than those of refugees is particularly pronounced because of the absence of effective democratic accountability and representation of those migrants and refugees whose rights are at issue.

A policy based on problematic assumptions

The EU's policy on migration in the HoA has not been based on a clearly set out and empirically grounded appreciation of the nature of cross-border movement in the region. Reference is made to the various forms of migration, but assumptions about the causes, nature and consequences of migration are largely implied or kept vague, rather than specifically addressed and contextualised. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) has now provided funding to the "Research and Evidence Facility" to generate such evidence.⁸ The latter's findings, together with the findings of other research projects, such as those reflected in this paper, can be expected to provide valuable information, which should, albeit belatedly, enable policy makers to develop policies that better reflect the complex realities of migration in the region.

In Europe's popular discourse, migration, including from the HoA, is frequently portrayed and perceived as economically motivated, "illegal" and/or detrimental to

7 Tuesday Reitano, *The Khartoum Process: A sustainable response to human smuggling and trafficking?* Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief 93, November 2016, 4. Available at <https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/the-khartoum-process-a-sustainable-response-to-human-smuggling-and-trafficking> (Accessed 5 October 2017).

8 EUTFA, Action Fiche for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window, T05-EUTF-HoA-REG-10: Research and Evidence Facility (Undated). See further <https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/> (Accessed 2 October 2017).

national security, or cultural identity.⁹ The policy flowing from this perception is a carrot and stick approach. The paradigm for responding to economically driven movement is state sovereignty, particularly the decision of who to admit and return. This is complemented by development assistance, particularly access to employment and livelihoods, which is used as a containment device and means to counter the perceived pull factors of migration – namely, seeking better living standards elsewhere.

The Khartoum Process stresses the importance of promoting sustainable development as a means to address root causes, suggesting that persons leaving their country in the HoA are doing so primarily for economic reasons, which is not the case.¹⁰ As the status of such migrants is often irregular, linking irregular migration and human smuggling or trafficking justifies measures taken against persons crossing borders. This gives states more discretion in how to treat persons and imposes fewer constraints on their ability to act as effective partners in migration management.

A primary focus on economic, or irregular migration also fails to adequately distinguish situations prevailing in various parts of, and countries in, the HoA. As the research shows, reasons for cross-border movement are varied, but a large number of individuals leaving countries in the region, particularly Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan, qualify for refugee status and protection.¹¹ The number of refugees from the region would be even higher if a substantial number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who often suffer from persecution, were (able) to leave their home countries.

Depicting lack of development and economic opportunities as main causes of migration is overly narrow and risks downplaying other key factors. It fails to sufficiently take into account the structural context in

which dire living conditions form part of a broader governance problem. It suggests that migration for economic reasons is voluntary, which is not the case where it is based on discrimination or punishment. It further assumes that migration can be prevented through development initiatives and/or information campaigns that deter would-be migrants by changing the perceived cost-benefit calculus. Yet, the prospect of improved livelihoods does not necessarily offset the multiple disadvantages displaced populations within the region face: encampment, lack of freedom of movement, discrimination and inadequate legal protection, including the risk of being forcibly returned to one's home country.

Their “illegality” often prompts Eritreans crossing borders to evade the authorities in neighbouring countries, particularly in Sudan, and enhances the vulnerability of persons treated as irregular migrants to abuse, including trafficking. Thus, policies that pursue the objective of combating irregular migration, including through reinforcing border security, but that do not offer a viable alternative to it, risk fostering illegal practices and thereby run counter to the policy objectives of effectively tackling trafficking.

An alternative, empirically grounded approach

The findings make it clear that there is a need for an alternative approach that heeds empirical findings and is therefore better suited to effectively address mixed migration. There are a number of characteristics of this approach.

First, it needs to be **people centric**, reflecting the experiences of the individuals and communities

9 See e.g. Bastian A. Vollmer, 'The Continuing Shame of Europe: Discourses on migration policy in Germany and the UK', *Migration Studies*, October 2016; Umut Korkut et al. (eds), *The Discourses and Politics of Migration in Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

10 Rome Declaration, 3: "Stressing the importance of addressing the push and pull factors, and the root causes of irregular migration and mixed migration flows between Africa and Europe and underlining in this context the importance of promoting sustainable development, in line with the global development agenda."

11 89% of Eritreans, 68% of Somali and 47% of Sudanese asylum-seekers were given status (refugees, subsidiary protection, humanitarian reasons) in EU member States. A. Bitoulas, "Population and social conditions", Eurostat, *Data in focus*, 3/2015, 13.

concerned; and enabling them to participate in the policy-making processes.

Second, it has to be **contextual**: understanding mixed migration as a complex reality and focusing on how best to address the root causes and multiple factors contributing to such realities. Such an approach demands a broader, mid- to long-term engagement beyond specific projects.

Third, it has to be **rights-based**. Developing a holistic approach that views protection of human rights and the protection of the rights of refugees and migrants is fundamental to any policy on mixed migration.

Finally, it has to be **based on mutuality and shared responsibility**. It has to acknowledge mixed migration as an issue of shared interest and concern and must be aimed at fostering mobility and sharing responsibility with a view to providing durable solution for those in need of protection.

A people-centric, contextual approach

There is a need for greater transparency and public participation in policy making both in the HoA and in Europe. First, policies have to be informed by the views of individuals and communities in the HoA who are among the intended beneficiaries. This model allows the development of a contextual approach that avoids making assumptions that are erroneous and enhances the likelihood that planned interventions are appropriate and effective.

Engagement with, and participation of, individuals and communities in relevant processes is also an integral part of a human rights based approach that is mandated by Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union¹² and many of the foreign human rights policies of states. It can also be derived from the Council of the EU's "Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa" objective of supporting "the people of the region in achieving peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government."¹³ Participation applies both to the

development of adequate policies and to effective monitoring mechanisms designed to ensure that the rights of those affected are fully taken into consideration and respected.

In addition, participation serves an important democratic function: it allows individuals and communities to represent their interests *vis-à-vis* states and institutions that often, in the HoA, have little democratic legitimacy. The same logic applies to European states and the EU in so far as they are not mandated by people in the region to represent their interests.

Greater participation within the region is also likely to increase the trust between foreign and international actors and local populations. The Khartoum Process is currently perceived by many in the HoA as a European or an international initiative that is meant to restrict movement and mobility of Africans and thus limit their right to enjoy opportunities and freedoms populations in Europe enjoy. In more extreme cases, it is viewed as an international scheme that is primarily attuned to the interests of predatory governments and will enhance their capacity to harm marginalised communities. These perceptions can result in alienation and hostility that can then undermine meaningful cooperation between the affected populations and international actors.

In the context of the EU and European states, the Khartoum Process, and policy making and external action in the field of migration, has been criticised for the lack of transparency and public debate. The European Parliament's resolution of 6 October 2016 highlights the unease generated by the limited democratic scrutiny and oversight.¹⁴ This matters, as it deprives political bodies and institutions of the ability to effectively monitor whether relevant authorities act in accordance with national and EU policies and legislation. It also deprives civil society of its vital watchdog function.

The absence of an informed debate and rigorous scrutiny is undemocratic and detrimental to good policy making. It makes it more difficult to scrutinise, and expose erroneous assumptions, and to act as corrective

12 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016/C 202/01), C 202/28.

13 Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa", 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 Nov.2011, Annex, 3.

14 European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2016 on Sudan (2016/2911 (RSP)).

where policies pursued turn out to be misconceived or misguided in their implementation. This equally applies to the overall coherence of policy making that runs counter to EU law and national policies.¹⁵

The lack of transparency and debate around the Khartoum Process has ostensibly been motivated by a desire to limit reputational risks and criticism of the nature and content of the processes.¹⁶ However, it has not shielded actors from criticism and is bound to enhance, rather than reduce, opposition to close partnerships with states in the region.

Therefore, any policy initiative on migration in the HoA should be firmly based on the principles set out in Article 21 TEU and the EU's Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy to ensure principled and coherent policy making and external action. Respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights entails that recognised good practices of policy making and implementation are integral to any initiatives and their implementation. This includes effective participation, transparency, and accountability, all of which, combined, act as important checks and mechanisms that promote sound policy making.

Human rights, mutuality, and shared responsibility

The EU policies, and bilateral Memoranda of Understanding, emphasise protection and respect for human rights. The Khartoum Process claims that "human rights constitute a cross-cutting issue of our cooperation".¹⁷ The protection of rights presents a particular challenge because of its multiple dimensions,

which should be clearly identified in any relevant policy making processes. Given the state centric nature of the European engagement with the HoA and the Khartoum Process, there is a risk that despite the rights respecting rhetoric, refugee and migrant rights will be neglected as state interests are prioritised.

Adequate recognition of refugees is crucial to guaranteeing that they can access effective protection and enjoy the rights granted to them under international refugee and human rights law. Importantly, refugees are not required to remain in a country that does not provide effective protection, including where reception conditions fall short of the rights set out in the Refugee Convention.¹⁸ European destination countries must therefore not deny recognition where the person concerned entered a neighbouring country, and other transit countries, but these places did not offer effective protection.

This is particularly important as migrants are still sometimes criminalised in the region, and deported even where they are at risk of ill treatment, without having adequate recourse to remedies.¹⁹ Migrants, whether refugees or not, who have been trafficked enjoy rights to protection, assistance and temporary status under the Palermo Protocol,²⁰ to which most states in the HoA are party.²¹ In practice, however, individuals are often not classified as victims of trafficking and are treated as irregular migrants instead, which results in a lack of adequate protection.²² Notably, however, migrants who do not qualify as refugees and were not trafficked are not without rights, even where their status is irregular.

15 M. Stern, 'The Khartoum Process: Critical Assessment and Policy Recommendations', Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers 15/49, Dec. 2015.

16 Stern, *ibid.*, 15: "Either the Process gains more public attention than intended and faces strong political opposition in Europe, or the African States are dissatisfied with the low political attention they get from their European partners, which will seriously harm the effectiveness of the process."

17 Rome Declaration, 3.

18 UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of "Effective Protection" in the Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers (Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9-10 December 2012), February 2003.

19 Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Hundreds Deported to Likely Abuse", New York, 30 May 2016. Available at www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/30/sudan-hundreds-deported-likely-abuse (Accessed 2 October 2017).

20 Articles 6-8 of the Palermo Protocol.

21 Djibouti, Egypt and Kenya have been parties to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol) since 2005, whereas Ethiopia (2012), Eritrea and Sudan (both in 2014) became parties only recently. Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya and Ethiopia are also parties to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Smuggling in Persons Protocol), Eritrea and Sudan are not. Somalia and South Sudan are not party to either protocol.

22 US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2016, 349.

Of course, the effective protection of these rights requires having adequate policies, laws and institutions in place and this is the primary focus of initiatives such as the Khartoum Process. However, there has been less focus on structural factors integral to rights protection, ie to a system based on respect for the rule of law and human rights, which includes independent institutions, civil society and others being tasked and/or able to monitor rights protection and ensure accountability. The current focus is of a targeted, short-term nature. It needs to be complemented by adequate monitoring mechanisms and parallel efforts to bring about broader structural reforms. Protection of refugees, and trafficking victims, is unlikely to be effective within settings that are deeply flawed, particularly those that lack effective rule of law and human rights guarantees.²³

The provision of adequate refugee protection is a major challenge for countries in the HoA. This challenge is systemic, social, economic, administrative, and ultimately, political. The solution to this challenge must move beyond providing money for host communities or enhancing the capacity of states in the region in pursuit of more effective containment policies. Preventing irregular migration and trafficking in human beings is unlikely to succeed unless there are avenues for legal migration and the causes for cross-border movements are adequately addressed. Initiatives that rely on

creating barriers without providing alternatives force people to take enormous risks.

Any fair partnership on mixed migration seriously concerned about rights protection must therefore address the question of responsibility sharing, that is, how European states will contribute to finding durable solutions for refugees and guaranteeing their protection. A number of policy options are available to this end. These include visa facilitation, the expansion of legal avenues for movement from the HoA to Europe, as well as resettlement, for the most vulnerable or needy, which should be explored and tailored to the particular context in consultation with states, civil society organisations and international organisations.

The European Commission recently recommended a resettlement scheme that will bring “at least 50,000 of the most vulnerable persons in need of international protection to Europe” by the end of October 2019, and announced that it has set aside EUR 500 million to “support Member States’ resettlement efforts.”²⁴ It has also noted that “increased focus should be put on resettling vulnerable persons from North Africa and the Horn of Africa; notably Libya, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, Chad and Ethiopia.”²⁵ These are important initial measures that should be supported and fully implemented by European countries, not to mention significantly expanded.

23 Lutz Oette and Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker, “Migration Control á la Khartoum: EU External Engagement and Human Rights Protection in the Horn of Africa”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2017.

24 European Commission, “Press release: State of the Union 2017 – Commission presents next steps towards a stronger, more effective and fairer EU migration and asylum policy.” 27 September 2017. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3406_en.htm (Accessed 8 October 2017).

25 Ibid. See also European Commission, “Commission Recommendation on enhancing legal pathways for persons in need of international protection.” 27 September 2017. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170927_recommendation_on_enhancing_legal_pathways_for_persons_in_need_of_international_protection_en.pdf (Accessed 8 October 2017).

Policy recommendations

- **Develop an empirically grounded, participatory and rights-based policy on mixed migration in the Horn of Africa aimed at tackling the root causes of smuggling and trafficking in human beings.**
- **Invite individuals, community representatives and civil society organisations** from the region to all relevant official meetings and provide them with the opportunity to make presentations on their situation and on extant and planned policies and their implementation;
- **Hold parliamentary debates on relevant initiatives** concerning issues related to migration and refugees in the HoA, and regularly update national parliaments and the European parliament respectively on developments, concerns raised and how they have been addressed;
- **Submit planned initiatives and projects to relevant national institutions**, such as human rights commissions (particularly in case of bilateral MoUs, such as between Italy and Sudan) and European institutions for scrutiny as to their compatibility with applicable policy guidelines and human rights standards;
- **Appoint independent monitors** mandated to scrutinise the compatibility of initiatives and their implementation with applicable human rights and refugee rights standards, and to report regularly to relevant bodies (implementing agencies, states, EU, parliaments, national institutions) and the public at large;
- **Expand the existing mechanisms, and develop new avenues, for legal mobility** between Africa and Europe, such as visa facilitation, resettlement and student exchange schemes;
- **Expand and facilitate responsibility sharing** through resettlement schemes, particularly by agreeing, in close cooperation with relevant organisations, on numbers of vulnerable persons in need of resettlement, and working in cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee to resettle vulnerable populations who are entitled to international protection directly from states in North Africa and the HoA.



www.refugee-rights.org

The International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) was founded in 2004 to inform and improve responses to the cycles of violence and displacement. IRRI has developed a holistic approach to the protection of human rights before, during, and in the aftermath of displacement, by identifying the violations that cause displacement and exile; protecting the rights of those who are displaced; and ensuring the solutions to their displacement are durable, rights respecting, safe and timely.



www.sihanet.org

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) is a network of civil society organisations from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Uganda, and the coastal area of Kenya. Established in 1995 by a coalition of women's rights activists with the aim of strengthening the capacities of women's rights organisations and addressing women's subordination and violence against women and girls in the Horn of Africa, SIHA is now comprised of close to 75 members.



www.soas.ac.uk/human-rights-law

The Centre for Human Rights Law, SOAS, University of London, provides a forum for scholarship and collaborative approaches on human rights law in practice. It has hosted a number of events, made submissions and provided expert testimony on human rights in Sudan and policies on mixed migration in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on the Khartoum Process.

This research project is part of the research agenda of the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law and funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs through NWO-WOTRO.