Refugee Rights News
Volume 4, Issue 2
April 2008
What is in a Name? A Reflection on the Terminology of Post-Election Violence in Kenya
At the end of February, Kofi Annan managed to broker a deal between Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki, and Orange Democratic Movement Leader Raila Odinga, offering the latter the position of Prime Minister in exchange for ceding the post of contested Presidency to the former.
March 3, the New York Times ran an opinion piece whose headline asserted “African Genocide Averted.” The article argues that the negotiations in lead by Mr. Annan offered salvation for a nation about to descend into chaos. But the killings of 12 in the Mt. Elgon region of Kenya on the same day may serve as a vivid reminder that a solution is not so simply achieved.
But was Kenya really on the brink of genocide? And what does the tangle of descriptions of Kenya’s post-election violence mean for its future and its past. Certainly, the cry of alarm—and presumably the ensuing relief at a settlement—has not emanated only from the West.
On January 10, famed Kenya novelist Ngugi wa Thiongo, raised the dire specter of genocide when interviewed on the BBC. “[A] single instance of premeditated ethnic cleansing can lead to an unstoppable cycle of vendettas,” he asserted, verbally placing Kenya at the edge of a precipice. And he went on to remind the world what lay at the bottom. “The world does not need another Bosnia; Africa certainly does not need another Rwanda.”
In the pages of the Kenyan media, a vigorous debate was had about the nature of the violence. On January 12, the “g-word” appeared in the pages of Kenya’s Saturday Nation, in an article entitled “Has the crime of genocide been committed in Kenya?” Although Peter Mwaura, the author, ultimately came down on the question with a resounding no, he noted that both sides in the conflict had used this terminology, quoting both former Lands Minister Kivutha Kibwana, “it is becoming clear that these well organised acts of genocide were well-planned, financed and rehearsed by ODM leaders,” and Odinga himself accusing Kibaki of “genocide on a grand scale.”
On the 23rd of January, ODM representative Professor Anyang’ Nyong’o said that the party had complained formally to the International Criminal Court about the “crimes against humanity” and “state-sponsored terrorism.”
In Kenya, the impact of this may have been to push the nation further towards the brink. In the words of Muthoni Wanyeki, the Chair of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, “people are more and more angry, and the ‘genocide’ terminology is only fueling the fire.”
An additional danger of this type of rhetoric has been in affecting international perceptions of the crisis. Thousands of miles away, removed from any lived experience of the crisis, Americans are perhaps only more vulnerable to the war of words.
In January, protesters gathered opposite the United Nations in New York, holding up signs alerting passersby to the ongoing “genocide” in Kenya.
I can picture the unnamed, average American, you know the one that can’t find Kenya on a map passing by. “In Kenya?” he asks. “Really? My aunt went there on vacation one time, I am glad that she made it out alive….”
In the newspaper, our American might have read equally dire coverage. If he or she had happened to open the Los Angeles Times on January 13, he or she might have come across a picture of a beleaguered Kenyan man with a long scar across his head. A few lines down they might have read this description:
In Kenya's deadly post-election violence, a terrible spasm that pitted tribe against tribe, he had ambled unknowingly across an invisible border: a Luo man in Kikuyu territory.
Although this characterization was challenged, it may stick with those who look no further. But if they look no further, aren’t they bound to be confused? What impact does all of this really have?
Well in Rwanda, the description of the violence as “tribal” is credited with making it appear both inevitable and unstoppable to a population and a government disinclined to act in any case. In the situation in Darfur, application of the genocide terminology seems to have been as far as the Bush Administration was prepared to go in terms of action. At the same time, the debate over whether the violence was, or was not, in fact, a genocide both distracted attention which might more valuably have been applied to actually working towards a resolution to the crisis and exposed fissures in the international community which might have been more effective if it had appeared to stand as one.
It is therefore not by chance that in addressing Americans about what they wanted to see from the US in terms of resolving the crisis in an Op-Ed in the New York Times, Maina Kiai and L. Muthoni Wanyeki, included a request that Washington “refrain from simplistic characterizations of the violence as a matter of ethnic cleansing or tribal conflict, when in fact the roots of the problem are political.”
All violence in Africa must not be mistaken for unbridled ethnic hatred or genocide. Painting it in those terms runs the risk of encouraging a weary West to throw up its arms. Or it might emblazon an image of an irredeemable violence on a generation of investors and vacationers who up to now had no other image of Kenya. Its once bustling tourism hubs are nearly deserted and investors are understandably cautious. Kenya is already projected to lose 3.8 billion US dollars as a result of the crisis—how quickly can it recover if it is haunted by images of unstoppable violence?
At the same time, the urge to paint the crisis as “over” to stack one in the win column for a beleaguered international community often accused of doing too little too late in Africa must also be avoided, because it may encourage foreign governments to return too early to “business as usual,” undermining support for the long term reforms that need to accompany any deal. In the words of Kiai and Wanyeki, “calm must not be mistaken for peace.”
As Human Rights Watch pointed out in its report, Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance, international intervention, particularly by the African Union and the United Nations, was lauded for effectively supporting efforts to stem the violence and reach a settlement. They commented that this early intervention could be seen as an effective mechanism for putting the responsibility to protect (which was recognizes that the international community has a responsibility to act where governments are not protecting their citizens from mass atrocities).However, as Human Rights Watch points out, this laudable intervention risks obscuring years of neglect of corruption and impunity. Just as more consistent engagement on these issues might have averted the crisis, a long-term approach to future engagement will be critical in maintaining stability. Constitutional, police and justice reforms and truth and accountability will be needed to build a truly stable and prosperous Kenya.
