The Darfur Peace Agreement: What hope for the displaced?

Refugee Rights News
Volume 3, Issue 2
July 2006

On May 5, 2006, the Government of Sudan and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minnawi signed a peace agreement in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. Nearly two months later the debate about the viability of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) rages on. Although it has been welcomed by many as a first step toward peace, some question the viability of the agreement as long as two major groups in the opposition refuse to sign. Others have criticized what they view as the agreement’s weak implementation mechanisms, and cite the lack of progress since the signature of the accord. 

In Darfur, groups of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been involved in demonstrations about the agreement, criticizing the deal and calling for international intervention. The heavy pressure on some parties to sign and the continued resistance of others has only added to the suspicion with which the agreement is viewed. There has been a lack of detailed discussion of what the agreement offers. 

What does the DPA offer to the displaced?

The DPA agreement addresses the concerns of Darfurians and the Parties through three pillars: security, wealth sharing and power sharing. In respect to the latter, for example, it calls for increased representation by Darfurians in government, including granting a post of Special Assistant to the President Darfur. It also stipulates that a referendum on the integration of the three Darfur states into a single region will be held in 2010. The agreement runs to over 100 pages of detailed provisions and deserves careful and close examination. This article will only focus on those aspects of the agreement which particularly relate to responding to the experience of displacement; we recognize that all the agreement’s provisions are relevant to displaced Darfurians.
 
Security in IDP camps

Security is the need most urgently cited by IDPs throughout Darfur. In laying out the ceasefire arrangements, the Parties commit to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access and ensure security in IDP camps. The DPA provides for African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Civilian Police to be deployed in IDP camps in coordination with the Government of Sudan or the Movements, depending on who controls the relevant territory. The Ceasefire Commission is charged with overseeing the creation of demilitarized zones around IDP camps in which Parties may not deploy their forces and in which no weapons may be carried except by AMIS personnel. Going forward, the Parties also pledge to create a secure environment which will be conducive to voluntary return.

Humanitarian Needs

The specific needs of refugees and internally displaced persons with regard to humanitarian assistance and laying the groundwork for return are dealt with in Article 21 of the Agreement (Urgent Programs for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Refugees and other War Affected Persons and Compensation for War-Affected Persons). The section begins by affirming that IDPs and war-affected persons have the same rights as all other Sudanese citizens and that they have the right to return to their places of origin. It also recognizes that in order for the displaced to return they must have security and access to basic resources such as potable water and adequate educational and health facilities.

In practical terms, the section promises the creation of a Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission (DRRC). The DRRC is mandated to monitor the situation of internally displaced persons and to “grant the United Nations, NGOs and other humanitarian agencies access to displaced and war-affected populations.” NGOs and UN agencies have had numerous problems in gaining access to the displaced in Darfur. The creation of the DRRC is to be welcomed if it results in greater access to populations in need. It is unclear, however, how this new organ will interact with national authorities such as the Humanitarian Aid Commission. The final provision in the section, which states that disputes should be referred to the national authorities, is worrying in this respect. If the decisions of the DRRC can be overturned easily by the national HAC, then the new body may be reduced to the status of an additional layer of bureaucracy.

The DRRC will also conduct registration of displaced persons and facilitate the issuance to IDPs of all necessary documentation, such as passports, marriage and birth certificates, documents which are crucial to establishing identity and accessing other rights. Most humanitarian agencies agree that it is only with an accurate demographic picture of the population that their needs can be adequately addressed. It is hoped that displaced persons will be included in the design of the registration process, and that due attention is paid to ensuring that confidentiality is respected. These will be especially important issues in the Darfurian context given the generally low level of confidence which IDPs have in the government.

The DRRC’s functions with regard to humanitarian affairs are to be supplemented by a Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit (JHFMU), which is to be created by AMIS within 14 days of the signing of the agreement. The JHFMU is charged with monitoring the humanitarian situation and making recommendations to AMIS, humanitarian actors and the Parties. Two months after the signing of the agreement, however, there is no indication that this body has been created.

Restitution of Property and Compensation

Another important function of the DRRC will be to ensure restitution or compensation to returnees for property lost as a result of the conflict. A separate body – the Compensation Commission – is to be tasked with compensation for physical or emotional injury. The two bodies are to work in tandem, with the DPA providing, for example, that cases brought to the Compensation Commission regarding lost property shall be referred to Property Claims Committees also to be set up by the DRRC.

The provisions of the DPA do not provide in detail for the structure of these processes, but do set out general principles. The DRRC’s procedures for ensuring compensation must be “just, timely, accessible, free of charge, and age and gender sensitive;” the Compensation Commission is to be representative of affected communities and its work transparent. Transparency is also an important element of the property restitution process: hearings on these matters are to be held in public and written decisions are to be issued.

The Property Claims Committees are to be mandated to resolve disputes relating to land stemming from the displacement of the original owners or users of the land. Again, although the procedures of the Committees are to be decided on by the Committees in consultation with DRRC, there are general principles set forth in the Agreement. The DPA provides that the Committees should be independent and impartial. It also notes that they should encourage full participation and have access to all necessary land and other records.

The Committees will likely be dealing with extremely sensitive issues. Given widespread allegations that villages from which people have been displaced have been occupied by those from “Arab” tribes, these claims are likely to also be ethnically charged. If they are to effectively resolve conflicts, they must be seen to be impartial and take due note of traditional land ownership systems.

Adequately addressing restitution and compensation is critical for sustainable return. Many Darfurians have lost property crucial to their survival; entire villages have been burned, wells have been poisoned, and livestock has been stolen or killed. Unless serious efforts are made to ensure that property is either returned or compensated in such a way that it allows the displaced to rebuild, return will be unsustainable.

One important element of this is how the work of the Compensation Commission will be funded. The DPA does not address this except to say that the government of Sudan is willing to commit $30 million dollars to this effort. Although a substantial sum, it has been widely criticized as not nearly enough. In fact, if we were to assume that each of the estimated 3.8 million war affected persons in Darfur were entitled to some form of compensation, this sum would work out to merely US $7.89 per person.

Regeneration of the region

In addition to these mechanisms for compensation and restitution, the need for a program of rebuilding and development in the region has been recognized in the agreement.  In this regard the parties have agreed to the creation of a Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF). The DRDF is to raise funds within Sudan and abroad and disperse this money in an effort to ensure the resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration of displaced persons and to “address past development imbalances.”

An important question in assessing the potential impact of the DRDF is how funds will be channeled from international donors. It is likely that international donors will prefer to give funds via channels with which they are already familiar in the UN system and among NGOs. If this is the case, the resources of the DRDF may be dwarfed by the resources available to UN actors and international NGOs. The DRDF’s relevance may therefore be determined in large part by its relations with donors, international and national NGOs and the UN system.

Implementation and next steps

Despite its flaws, the Darfur Peace Agreement lays out a framework within which to address the needs of the internally displaced in Darfur. However, its implementation is hanging by a thread, undermined by the failure of parties to the conflict to sign on, and delay in achieving the implementation deadlines. It is urgent that the parties to the conflict and the international community continue dialogue, particularly through the establishment of inter-Darfurian and inter-Sudanese dialogue which helps to address outstanding concerns and mistrust.