Refugee Rights News
Volume 4, Issue 6
October 2008

Features and Analysis

Northern Uganda since the Collapse of the Juba Talks

The Juba peace process, which many hoped would end northern Uganda’s 21 year conflict, virtually collapsed in April when Joseph Kony, leader of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement. Kony explained that his refusal was motivated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants outstanding for him and his top commanders. Then, in mid-September, David Matsanga, a spokesman for the rebels, said that Kony had agreed to sign the Final Peace Agreement “anytime,” however the LRA would not disarm until the ICC arrest warrants were lifted. In place since 2005, the warrants have been a sticking point throughout the negations, especially after the Accountability and Reconciliation phase produced an agreement on domestic trials for atrocities committed during the conflict.

This article surveys developments in northern Uganda since the talks stalled. Although the LRA have not resumed violence in northern Uganda, the failure to sign the Final Peace Agreement has left the future of the region in flux. As the debate over accountability rages on, the region faces ongoing violence, displaced from northern Uganda to other countries; the threat of renewed military action; and a daunting return and reconstruction challenge.

Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation

On 19 February the government of Uganda and the LRA signed an Annex to the 29 June 2007 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (the Principal Agreement). The Principal Agreement provided that whether accountability was pursued in formal courts or using traditional justice would depend upon the severity of the crime. The Annex expanded upon this framework, providing that a domestic war crimes court would try individuals alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict, while traditional justice would address lesser crimes.

The Principal Agreement and the Annex pave the way for admissibility and other jurisdictional challenges in respect of the cases before the ICC, which under the principle of complementarity cannot pursue cases genuinely prosecuted at the national level. Aware of this, Kony had refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement until the ICC warrants were “withdrawn” – which, as explained below, is not as straightforward as Kony’s position suggests. The government countered that it would not seek ICC “withdrawal” until the Final Peace Agreement was signed.

The Juba Peace Process

The Juba peace process was divided into six distinct agenda items. The Final Peace Agreement consists of all the substantive agreements reached on each of the agenda items since the peace process began in 2006, including the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and its six Addenda; the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions and its Protocol; the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and its Annex; the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire; the Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, which Kony recently refused to implement unless the ICC warrants are lifted; the Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms; and the Implementation Schedule which was to be signed with and attached to the Final Peace Agreement.

Current prospects for concluding the Juba process with the signature of the Final Peace Agreement are grim. Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni stated in July that his government would not hold further negotiations with Kony but instead would wait for him to sign the Final Peace Agreement, however the LRA continue to make demands and request meetings. In a 25 July letter to chief mediator Riek Machar, copied to United Nations envoy Joachim Chissano, the LRA demanded the withdrawal of the Ugandan army (UPDF) from southern Sudan. A subsequent meeting between Kony and Machar scheduled to discuss the demand fell through. South Sudan government officials cited logistical problems, while LRA representative Matsanga claimed that Kony cancelled the meeting because food was not made available at the meeting site. Kony then requested a late August meeting to discuss the contents of the Final Peace Agreement, stating that it had “been officially opened for scrutiny.” That meeting also failed to materialise, in part because the Ugandan government insists that negotiations are closed. Kony is welcome to sign the Final Peace Agreement that has already been prepared, they say, but its contents cannot be revisited.

On 11 September, Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over, in part due to LRA’s attitude and soaring costs. Two days later, however, further to Kony’s apparent decision to sign the Final Peace Agreement, members of the Ugandan parliament and religious and cultural leaders from northern Uganda, who hope to meet with Kony in the coming weeks to convince him to sign, travelled to Juba to take part in arrangements towards the signing of the Final Peace Agreement and to witness it pursuant to a request by the LRA’s chairman. The Final Peace Agreement, however, remains unsigned as Kony’s pattern of declaring he will sign and then failing to do so becomes further entrenched.

Perhaps in response to the failed peace process, in early August the government of Uganda extended deadline for registration under the Amnesty Act – which over 12,000 LRA fighters, including Kony’s chief negotiator in Juba, have taken advantage of since 2000 – by two years to encourage further defections. Similarly, despite the failure to conclude the Final Peace Agreement, the government also pledged to implement some of its obligations under the interim Juba agreements. Some of the issues to be addressed include resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) and the cessation of military activities in northern Uganda. The government has also constituted the war crimes court agreed under agenda item three.

The War Crimes Court

The domestic war crimes court agreed during the Accountability and Reconciliation phase of the Juba process, constituted by Principal Judge Akiiki-Kiiza and two other judges, was set to begin operating in August. Operations have, however, been delayed due to the failure to finalise legislation to govern the Court’s operations. There are a number of outstanding issues, including the definition of crimes, the assignment of penalties, the limit on the Court’s jurisdiction to prevent retrospective application of new laws, the regime for witness protection, the strategy to deal with alleged criminals who were abducted as children, the location and budget. A working group, comprised of members of the Justice Law and Order sector of the Ugandan government, has been established to examine some of the issues. The working group, which has sub-committees on judicial, legislative, financial and traditional justice issues as well as truth telling, started its work in July and is expected to report to Parliament by November.

The International Criminal Court

Despite the constitution of the Ugandan war crimes court and LRA calls for the ICC warrants to be “withdrawn,” under ICC rules the Court’s jurisdiction can only be curtailed in three specific ways. First, ICC judges could deem the Uganda cases inadmissible by operation of the principle of complementarity in response to a petition by the defendants or another group. Second, the United Nations Security Council could resolve to defer prosecutions for a period of 12 months, which could be renewed indefinitely. Finally, the ICC prosecutor could argue that prosecutions are no longer in the interests of justice.

None of the above options have been pursued, so for the moment, the ICC warrants remain in force. However, Kony and the other indictees are likely hiding out in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Sudan, and in the absence of the success of the proposed military solution discussed below, weak governmental authority in those states mean the rebels will likely remain at large.

Regional Insecurity

The consequences of the rebels roving the region have been dire: the LRA has been conducting child abductions reminiscent of those that plagued northern Uganda for the better part of 20 years in eastern CAR, north-eastern DRC (where LRA rebels are also reportedly building new bases) and southern Sudan. The United Nations reports that in recent months southern Sudan has seen a rise in LRA attacks. Towards the end of September, Sudanese officials claimed that nearly 100 LRA rebels had attacked a military barracks in the Western Equatoria region, killing a child and a south Sudanese soldier. Around the same time, the LRA also reportedly abducted approximately 90 children in north-eastern DRC, causing over 75,000 people to flee their homes. Following these renewed LRA attacks against civilians, in October the ICC Prosecutor called for renewed efforts to arrest Kony and his top commanders.

Although the LRA are no longer active in northern Uganda, having moved on to other countries in the region, northern Uganda is by no means free from conflict. Former members of pro-government militias are being blamed for a recent series of brutal killings, which have spread fear among the region’s population. Some serving members of the UPDF are also believed to be involved in the murders, which authorities are struggling to stem.

A Military Solution?

One option for apprehending the ICC indictees and stemming regional insecurity is the military solution proposed by regional leaders, whose position has been fuelled by impatience with the peace process. President Joseph Kabila of DRC, for example, is reportedly becoming increasingly impatient with efforts to peacefully end the conflict and deems it necessary to pursue a military option against the rebels. UPDF chief General Aronda Nyakeirima has stated that his army is prepared to launch operations against the LRA. These positions coalesced at the end of June, when the leaders of Uganda, DRC and South Sudan agreed to coordinate military efforts to stamp out the rebellion. However, prospects for credible military pressure on the LRA remain elusive and, if apprehended, whether Kony and his cronies would be handed over to Uganda or to the ICC will depend on the effect of Uganda’s war crimes court on ICC jurisdiction.

Reconstruction and Return in the North

As the debate about the ICC rages on and the LRA continues to wreak havoc in CAR, the DRC and Sudan, a measure of calm has returned to northern Uganda. President Museveni has assured people there that the LRA will never return to Acholiland to disturb the peace being consolidated by the government through its Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), the framework introduced in July for rebuilding the north and assisting IDPs who are going back to their home areas.

Despite relative peace and the existence of the PRDP, many IDPs have yet to complete the process of return, maintaining homes in IDP camps or transit sites while returning home during the days to cultivate land and ready it for permanent settlement. Two principal reasons underlie this bifurcated living: first, Kony’s failure to sign the Final Peace Agreement has led some people to fear that the LRA might return to northern Uganda. Some commentators, who have warned that the prospect of a new military offensive may set the LRA on the warpath, echo this sentiment. Second, basic services in the return areas are far from adequate for those resettling. Refugees International highlights clean water, education and health care as priority areas as Ugandan and international aid programmes transition from humanitarian to reconstruction and development efforts. Another important issue as IDPs return home will be the issue of land. During the period of displacement, many IDPs’ land was taken over by corporations or individuals. The allocation of land and the provision of compensation for lost land represent significant challenges.

The Road to Resolution?

With the Final Peace Agreement yet to be signed, the unknown fate of ICC jurisdiction, the LRA contributing to regional insecurity and northern Uganda’s population living in limbo, the only thing that is clear is that the situation in northern Uganda is far from being resolved. Rather, it remains fraught with outstanding issues. All eyes are on the region as the LRA, the government of Uganda, the Juba mediators and the ICC grapple with them.

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